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This paper describes a comprehensive method to design, test and then implement a 
Payments for Ecosystem Services (PES) framework to combat the environmental 
consequences of extensive native vegetation clearance in Australia. Clearing of 
vegetation, primarily due to the expansion of farming areas, has often resulted in 
regional dryland and irrigation salinity. The market based approach adopted – a 
groundwater recharge credit trading scheme – was designed using empirical data 
from a social survey and experimental economics. The objective of the trial is to test 
the cost effectiveness of an incentive based recharge credit trade scheme designed 
to engage landholders in establishing and managing deep rooted pasture and woody 
perennials to reduce these adverse salinity impacts. The scheme, based on a 
voluntary ‘cap and trade’ approach, allows farmers to meet recharge obligations by 
land management actions or by trading credits. Assessment of the scheme so far 
suggests that an incentive for aggregate group outcome achievement included in the 
design may have motivated higher enrollment rates than would have otherwise 
resulted. A schedule has been developed relating land management practices and 
recharge credits. The audited performance based payment system, has provided 
increased motivation to manage for environmental outcomes compared to the 
previous policy. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Widespread clearing of deep rooted perennial native vegetation on individual 
landholdings in Australia, primarily for agriculture, has occurred over the last 200 
years. Environmental consequences have manifested as increased dryland and 
irrigation related salinity, reduced habitat for native species, rising water tables, and 
declining water quality in rivers and streams. Past policy approaches to address the 
adverse environmental consequences of native vegetation clearance have often not 
motivated land management changes at a scale sufficient to meet mitigation targets. 
Using a case study approach, this paper describes a developed methodology to 
assist in the implementation of a Payments for Environmental Services (PES) 
framework to combat the effects of native land clearing. This  PES approach – a 
groundwater recharge credit trading scheme – was implemented in the Bet Bet 
Catchment dryland farming community of north central Victoria, Australia (Figure 1). 
FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE 
  In Australia, the approaches falling under the PES framework are referred to 
as Market Based Instruments (MBIs). Market Based Instruments involve regulations 
or laws that encourage behavioral change through the price signals of markets, as 
opposed to the explicit directives for environmental management associated with 
regulatory and centralized planning measures (Stavins, 2003). The primary 
motivation for MBI approaches is that if environmentally appropriate behavior can be 
made more rewarding to land managers, then private choice will better correspond to 
the best social, economic and environmental outcomes. To encourage development 
of market based approaches to water quality and salinity from diffuse sources, the 
Australian Commonwealth Government allocated funds to eleven MBI pilot projects 
in 2003 (NAP, 2003; Grafton, 2005). 
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  The Bet Bet Catchment is a relatively small catchment of approximately 9600 
ha. in the Murray Darling Basin, identified as the major source of more than 40,000 
tonnes of salt annually entering the Boort irrigation area from the Loddon dryland 
catchment areas (Connor et al., 2004). The Bet Bet Catchment (which lies in the 
south west corner of the Loddon River Catchment) was chosen as an area to field 
test a recharge cap and trade policy because recharge in the area contributes more 
salt per volume of drainage to local rivers than any other sub-catchment in the region 
(Clifton, 2004). 
  Figure 2 is a schematic representation of rising groundwater recharge levels 
resulting from land management effects in catchments similar to the Bet Bet. 
Groundwater recharge increases as an inverse function of the level of deep rooted 
perennial vegetation (illustrated in panel B). Increased hydraulic pressure in the 
mound above the saline aquifer causes a subsequent rise in both the water table 
and the level of salt intrusion in the river system. In the Bet Bet region, the majority of 
salinity impacts are exported to downstream river districts, where the costs of 
salinization are incurred primarily by downstream irrigators. Increased volumes of 
recharge resulting from native vegetation clearance, lead to episodes of increasingly 
mobilized salt loads in the landscape. The additional salt is exported into connected 
river systems presenting a risk for the long-term viability of downstream irrigated 
horticultural and agricultural crops through soil salinization that leads to yield loss. In 
addition, increased river water salinity levels lead to accelerated infrastructure 
degradation (Clifton 2004), and threaten the functional organization of downstream 
riparian ecosystems (Overton and Jolly, 2004). 
FIGURE 2 ABOUT HERE 
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  Recharge rates and associated rates of salt mobilization in the area depend 
on the regional geomorphology with localized fractured rock conducive to high 
groundwater recharge rates. In addition, the rate of recharge and thus external 
salinity impacts, depend on the type of vegetation ground cover and farm specific 
cropping, grazing and management decisions. Extensive replacement of deep rooted 
woody perennials and perennial pasture with shallow rooted annual pastures has 
been identified as a key factor in increased rainwater soil percolation and 
subsequent groundwater recharge. 
  The dryland salinity problems explained above are becoming increasingly 
common across agricultural regions in Australia. This pilot project was designed to 
test an MBI approach to motivate re-vegetation efforts and thus reduce consequent 
groundwater recharge. The objective of the trial was to develop and test the 
feasibility of a recharge credit scheme to provide flexible incentives to motivate more 
cost effective re-vegetation efforts, to reduce consequent groundwater recharge, 
mobilized salt loads and eventual levels of river salinity. 
  Tradeable permit schemes for managing environmental problems are 
becoming more widely accepted by policy makers in Australia, North America and 
elsewhere (Randall, 2003; Sterner, 2003; Harrington et al., 2004). Subject to 
controversy and debate ten years ago (Keohane et al., 1998), MBIs have evolved to 
the point of becoming received wisdom in many environmental policy circles 
(Stavins, 2003). The National Action Plan for Salinity and Water Quality and the 
National Heritage Trust exemplify a Commonwealth impetus for the increasing 
application of market based solutions in Australia. Despite this increasing 
acceptance, Tietenberg (1998, 1999) concludes that many tradeable permit 
schemes have failed because of inadequate attention to ex ante instruments and 
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institutional design. To date, a priori prescriptions of alternate market institutions and 
auction systems, calibrated to catchment specifications, enabling the reliable 
translation of market theory to an operational reality, have not yet emerged. The 
outcome for managing authorities may be the hasty adoption and implementation of 
potentially inappropriate market structures and procedures, often to expedite and 
satisfy policy imperatives. Any adverse consequences of a poorly designed scheme 
may remain undetected for long time periods, possibly eroding the potential 
economic benefits and exacerbating the problem that the change was originally 
intended to resolve. Inappropriate design may also negate the opportunity for further 
innovation. 
  This paper describes a novel methodology used in the design and evaluation 
of the Bet Bet recharge trading scheme. The approach involved ex ante identification 
and evaluation of a complete range of potential impediments to the effective 
functioning of a market for the exchange of tradeable recharge credits. Experimental 
economics settings were framed by a synthesis of salient biophysical, economic, and 
attitudinal characteristics and prevailing social norms of the catchment (Ward et al. 
2006). Experimental treatments measured and evaluated behavioral responses to 
alternative cap and trade solutions and voluntary, community crafted compacts for 
recharge management. The ex ante design and testing methodology used in this trial 
represents an emerging systematic process for policy-makers to gain confidence, 
experience and expertise in the design and testing of a cap and trade policy prior to 
its implementation. Until recently, in-depth appraisals of the potential inclusion and 
capacity of cap and trade instruments in Australian policy portfolios have been 
limited. This paper shows how the design and testing methodology empirically 
informed on-ground policy implementation, including detailed specification of 
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landholder obligations to manage recharge, credit accounting and trading rules, 
monitoring protocols and non-compliance enforcement. 
ACTORS AND ECOSYSTEM SERVICES INVOLVED 
The trial is designed to demonstrate that a market based approach to achieving land 
use change is a viable alternative to the current government system of regulatory 
approaches, and input based payment incentives. In the past, government 
sponsored efforts to motivate changes in management regimes on privately tenured 
land have relied on traditional farm extension processes, legal and statutory 
remedies and a scheme providing scheduled payments for the re-establishment and 
management of deep rooted perennials. Despite regional promotion, the level of 
established re-vegetation and consequent groundwater recharge and river salinity, 
have not been at a scale sufficient to comply with prescribed salinity targets (Connor 
et al., 2004). 
  The status quo property rights arrangement in Victoria where the trial is being 
implemented involves no explicit requirements for dryland farmers to meet water 
quality requirements or to manage levels of recharge resulting from their practices. 
Nor are there currently any well defined and enforceable arrangements that would 
allow those who may suffer adverse consequences of increased salinity to 
compensate farmers causing salinity to reduce impacts. In essence what has existed 
is an implicit but poorly defined right of dryland farmers to manage recharge as they 
like. The trial scheme described was therefore implemented in an attempt to achieve 
better outcomes than previously administered instruments, constrained by extant 
property right regimes. The trial is expected to run for two years. 
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  The Bet Bet trial relies on voluntary participation in a process designed to 
demonstrate how altered individual land use decisions can contribute to collective 
outcomes that reduce the aggregate impact of salinity. The Bet Bet community is 
comprised of approximately 130 landholders, 17 of whom have agreed to enter into 
individual contracts to change land management actions on their properties and 
comply with individually specified and contractually obligated recharge targets. 
Collectively these individuals contribute to a catchment-wide (community) goal for 
aggregate recharge reduction.  Overall, the market elements of this trial, chosen 
through the trial design process, include: 
•  community agreement to achieve a specified level of recharge control, 
•  individual landholder contracts to achieve a specified level of recharge control 
in return for payment, 
•  trading of excess recharge credits between landholders in order for all 
landholders to meet their contract obligations, 
•  bonus payments to landholders who exceed their recharge control targets, and 
•  a community bonus if the catchment target is met or exceeded. 
  A tradeable recharge right involves establishing an enforceable, prescribed 
threshold of aggregate recharge attributable to the Bet Bet Catchment, distributing 
entitlements amongst recharge sources as a specified number of units and allowing 
trade of those units among scheme participants. To satisfy compliance obligations, 
each participant in the scheme must be able to surrender units equal to their 
entitlement at the end of an accounting period of two years. Therefore, participants 
can choose to alter land actions in response to individual management capacity, 
landscape attributes and production costs. Alternatively those in deficit can secure 
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additional recharge units from those in surplus through market exchange. 
Compliance is therefore defined in terms of a resource use cap rather than direct 
requirements for delivery of a service. The link between the two however is explicitly 
calculated and recorded when performance assessments are carried out. 
Performance is assessed by monitoring vegetative groundcover at the end of 
each cropping year in December. The functional relationship between vegetation 
type, management, landscape position and groundwater recharge in the Bet Bet 
Catchment has been previously established as part of the instrument design process 
(Connor et al., 2004; Clifton 2004). Audits, measuring the percentage of groundcover 
that landholders actually achieved, are conducted and the results used to compute 
an empirically based estimate of the recharge volume for each landholder. A credit 
surplus or deficit position is assigned based on the audited cover that each 
landholder has achieved relative to the level of credits that they committed to 
provide. 
  An independent ‘auditor’ is involved in the trial to audit pasture groundcover 
and tree establishment performance. For pastures, the auditor takes multiple 
measurements to provide a representative sample for each paddock. Measurements 
are taken using a 500x500 mm square with four evenly spaced, horizontal and 
vertical strings or wires. The quadrant wires intersect at 16 points within the square 
(Figure 3). Cover is assessed by placing the square on the pasture, grass or crop 
and then counting the number of intersections that lie directly above the green 
vegetation. The percentage of those 16 intersections that sit above green vegetation 
is the cover at that point. 
FIGURE 3 ABOUT HERE 
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  An additional actor involved in the trial is an independent ‘broker’ who is 
engaged to maintain the recharge accounts for each landholder. These accounts 
show: 
•  the obligation agreed to, 
•  the audited estimated recharge, 
•  the reference level of recharge, and 
•  the number of credits in excess or in deficit of the reference level. 
The broker is also able to facilitate the creation and trading of credits. Credits 
can be created by undertaking additional perennial plantings within the target 
catchment. Trading of credits facilitated by the broker can also take place for 
landholders holding salinity recharge credit surpluses or deficits. Salinity recharge 
credits can be traded at any price negotiated by the landholders. 
  While capping recharge imposes a cost on individuals, the opportunity to 
trade has the potential to compensate that loss or reduce the cost burden. Some 
individuals will choose to use more than their quantum (and incur a debit), and 
others will choose to use less (being rewarded with credits). The brokerage feature is 
an approach to overcome the policy challenge to create the opportunity for a 
“frictionless” market setting where participants can quickly learn to understand the 
advantages of trade with low learning and exchange costs relative to trade benefits. 
To the extent that brokerage reduces market friction, savings to landholders through 
market exchange between individuals with surplus credits and those in deficit may 
be considerable. Brokerage can increase the level of information from market 
exchange and thus reveal any differences in returns to management options that 
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reduce environmental consequences and thus enhance the probability that 
opportunities for gains from trade are quickly discovered and exploited. 
  The ecosystem services improved by the scheme are directly related to 
reduced levels of groundwater recharge and the lowering of salt levels in soils and 
waterways. With planting of deep rooted tree species, other ecosystem services, 
such as biodiversity and provision of shade for livestock, may also be improved. 
Spatially, the services affected and improved are located in the Bet Bet Catchment 
but also include down-stream water users and those who enjoy the amenity values 
of low lying floodplain areas affected by recharge from the Bet Bet region. 
Participants in the scheme however are only those that reside in the Bet Bet 
Catchment and volunteer to take part under the conditions of the contract. The 
eventual beneficiaries therefore may be downstream and not necessarily reside in 
the catchment. 
THE IMPLEMENTATION PROCESS 
Implementing the scheme takes place based on the contract agreed to by the 
landholder to establish and maintain perennial plantings in ways capable of reducing 
recharge in the landscape.  In essence, landholders will receive payment in 
exchange for their actions to change land-use. The actual agreements related to 
land-use change are restricted to the types of plantings involved. Five possibilities 
exist including: 
•  low density farm forestry, 
•  high density farm forestry, 
• native  tree  establishment, 
•  phalaris perennial pasture, or  
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•  lucerne perennial pasture. 
  Payment is based on performance and includes an establishment (initial) 
payment, and a management (subsequent) payment(s) based on monitored 
performance in the following years. Payment is on recharge credits calculated on a 
per hectare basis. Table 1 describes the levels of credits per hectare that can be 
achieved given monitored performance levels for each specific practice. The actual 
level of assigned credits depends on the level of cover of the pastures and/or the 
number of stems on tree plantings measured each year as described in the previous 
section. 
TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE 
  Based on the ex ante analysis, approximately 3000 credits are sought from 
tree based (forestry, native tree establishment) practices. Provided 90 per cent (2700 
credits) of the tree based target is met, up to 1000 credits will be available for 
perennial pasture (phalaris/lucerne) establishment. In total, $38.50 is offered to 
landholders for each unit of recharge they control over the life of the project. If a total 
of 3750 recharge units are produced then there will be a communal ‘bonus’ payment 
of $7500. 
  Table 2 gives an example of what outcomes of participation in such a tradable 
credit recharge scheme could look like for four different landholders in the Bet Bet 
region. 
TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE 
At the outset there were concerns that low returns to some farmers that had 
resulted in near zero enrollment in the existing scheduled payment scheme prior to 
the cap and trade trial would also lead to limited enrollment in the cap and trade 
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scheme. In fact, enrollment increased from only 5 ha in 2004 using a standard input 
based payment to over 100 ha in the 2005 cap and trade scheme. The relatively 
small scale of the program, viz. 17 participants, is a result of an intentionally limited 
number of targeted potential participants and limited budget for this trial program. 
ADDITIONAL INCENTIVES INVOLVED 
The voluntary nature of the credit trading scheme, contingent on the lack of 
articulated property right obligations for recharge management, means that non-
compliance within the Bet Bet Catchment does not attract any sanctions if people do 
not wish to participate. Vatn and Bromley (1995), Ostrom (1998) and Gintis (2000) 
argue that non-monetary rewards and motivations such as prestige, public 
recognition, group belonging, avoidance of group sanction, and desire to contribute 
to the public good can all represent powerful motivators in some contexts. There has 
been considerable theoretical work suggesting that policies involving collective 
outcome based payments or penalties can motivate high rates of environmental 
action and cost effectiveness in certain settings (Segerson, 1990; Isik and Sohngen, 
2003; Ipe et al., 2001). In particular, previous research (e.g. Ostrom, 1998; Gintis, 
2000; Tisdell and Ward, 2004) reports willingness to diverge from individualistic profit 
maximizing behavior for the public good in small, cohesive communities. Poe et al., 
2005 posit that a free riding problem can arise with collective incentive policy where 
there is too little individual incentive and individual behavior is not easily observed. 
  Given the small cohesive nature of the Bet Bet community revealed in social 
survey results (Connor et al. 2004), a policy designed to harness the potential power 
of pro-social motivations in the trial area may have potential to increase trial 
enrollment. Experimental economics results (Ward et al., 2006) suggest that a 
collective payment could have potential to address the risks of low enrolment given 
11 Encouraging Revegetation in Australia with a Groundwater Recharge Credit Scheme 
relatively flat payoffs to recharge reducing practices and informational challenges 
associated with understanding payoffs. Thus a feature of the scheme is a community 
level payment in addition to individual payments compensating establishment and 
opportunity costs. The community incentive is paid in the form of a community bonus 
if an aggregate recharge reduction target is met or exceeded. This type of scheme 
attempts to harness peer group pressure to ensure that each individual meets the 
contracted target so that the entire community benefits. There is also additional 
community based motivation for highly targeted, non-bidding members of the Bet Bet 
farming community to take part in the scheme. 
PERMANENCE, MONITORING AND ACCOUNTING  
Mechanisms have been put in place to ensure that the effects and benefits of the 
trial will extend into the future. One mechanism to favor more permanent action 
assigns credit levels and therefore payments based on two factors: 
•  Expected permanence – practices expected to be more permanent are given 
more credit (native vegetation protection is assumed to be more permanent 
than farm forestry which is assumed to be more permanent than perennial 
pasture). 
•  Expected annual recharge reduction – the expected recharge reduction for 
each practice has been estimated using a crop water balance model and are 
calculated relative to a defined baseline level of recharge equal to the 
estimated recharge under perennial pasture with 70 per cent December cover. 
With regards to permanence however, a lack of well defined property rights 
represents a significant impediment. Without a more explicit definition of either 
farmer obligations to manage groundwater recharge or rights to contract water 
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quality improvement for those adversely impacted by dryland recharge induced 
salinity, no formal and permanent market for recharge credit can be established. 
  A feature of the scheme to encourage more persistent action is a contract 
including not only commitments to establish perennial vegetation but also 
commitments to maintain plantings in a manner that will provide permanent recharge 
outcomes. While the former program in the area was based on input payments with 
no incentive for ongoing management to achieve environmental goals, the cap and 
trade policy rewards landholders who persist with management with performance 
based incentive payments. 
  Shortle and Horan (2001) and Schary (2003) argue that developing policies 
capable of realizing savings by focusing on performance coupled with compliance 
flexibility is challenging for diffuse source pollution because monitoring actual 
outcomes is often technically infeasible or very costly. This represents a substantial 
challenge to effective cap and trade schemes to address diffuse source 
environmental issues such as salinity. To effectively participate in the exchange of 
tradable recharge credits, land managers need accounting and auditing that allows 
an evaluation of their management decisions prior to implementation and monitoring 
of progress against their targets or commitments. Similarly, administrators of the 
scheme must also have the capacity to monitor and audit the outcomes of changes 
in land use or management practice and to attribute change in recharge to either 
landholder action or climate. Since groundwater recharge and salinity are not readily 
measured directly, a prerequisite to implementing a cap and trade is the 
development of a reliable and transparent surrogate indicator to assist all 
participants in evaluating recharge and salinity impacts of land management actions. 
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Thus a first step in this project was development of robust and community 
validated biophysical and hydrological modeling to provide information about 
groundwater recharge rates as a function of variable vegetation cover and land 
management at the farm scale, differentiated according to landscape position 
(Clifton, 2004; Connor et al., 2004). 
The resulting crop water model accounts for: 
•  differences in rates of annual and perennial crop and native tree evapo-
transpiration, 
•  temporal differences between tree and crop types for maximum transpiration 
rates to be realized; and 
•  differences in recharge reduction resulting from landscape position (differential 
recharge reduction is a function of rainfall, slope, soil permeability, levels of 
fractured granite and soil transmissivity). 
In the model (illustrated in Figure 1) Ri represents the recharge rate for farm i, 
managing crop j, where: 
Ri = (Cij, Aij, RAi, Gi, Lk): and (1) 
Cij is crop type and management 
Aij is area of crop type 
RAi is annual rainfall 
Gi is soil type and geomorphology 
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Lk is landscape position, k=1, 2 or 3 where: 
k=1 represents lower slope; 
k=2 represents break of slope;  
k=3 represents ridge and upper slope. 
j = 1-5, where: 
j=1 represents annual grazing; 
j=2 represents perennial pasture (phalaris set grazing); 
j=3 represents perennial pasture (phalaris rotational grazing); 
j=4 represents native tree vegetation; 
j=5 represents farm forestry (less than 10 years old). 
Cij, Aij represent endogenous variables in a farm decision set; 
and 
RAi, Gi, Lk represent exogenous variables in a farm decision set. 
  The model developed accounts for three key biophysical determinants of 
recharge differences across locations and actions shown in Figure 1: 
1.  Ceteris paribus, for crop j, recharge from lower slope (L1) is less than the 
recharge from break of slope (L2) which is less than recharge from upper 
slopes (L3). Viz. RL1<RL2<RL3. 
2.  Increased deep rooted perennial vegetation reduces groundwater recharge: viz. 
for landscape position Lk, subject to land management regime MP (Panel A) or 
MG (Panel B), recharge Ri is such that Ri Lk MP < Ri Lk. MG 
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3.  The estimated costs of groundwater recharge for land management activity at 
farm i, at landscape position Lk is such that; 
RMG  > RMP; recharge from annual grazing is greater than recharge from 
perennial grazing or forestry; 
WTMG  > WT MP; the water table level is higher for annual grazing than 
perennials; 
SLMG > SLMP; salt load is greater for annual grazing than perennials; 
CMG > CMP: incurred irrigation costs are greater for annual grazing than 
perennials. 
  Another impediment to establishing a robust, permanent, recharge exchange 
scheme is the potential for thin markets. One of the conditions necessary for 
efficient, functioning, competitive markets is a sufficient number of traders to ensure 
that no one participant can influence the terms on which transactions occur. Thin 
markets are characterized by small numbers of buyers and sellers. A limited number 
of buyers and sellers introduces the potential for credit trade market failure in a 
number of ways including price volatility and restricted supply (Stavins, 1995; 
Kampas and White, 2003), spatial concentration of permits, permit hoarding and a 
potential impedance of new market entrants (Tietenburg, 1998), a lower probability 
of satisfying market needs associated with increased transaction costs (Stavins, 
1995) and unreliable recharge outcomes (Dinar and Howitt, 1997). Goodstein (2002, 
p. 330) argues that the United States EPA’s emissions trading program, introduced 
in 1976, floundered because of thin markets and concerns about  permit hoarding 
and spatial concentration of effluent. Stavins (1995) argues that a thin market 
reduces market efficiency by raising the relative costs of transactions: fewer 
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participants implies a lower probability, both real and perceived, of finding trading 
partners to resolve market demands, while transaction costs remain constant or 
increase. To date, the trial focus has been on a relatively small area with relatively 
few participants. Smith (1982) argues a countervailing view, noting experimental 
economics findings that suggest that the numbers in the trial are sufficient to avoid 
thin market problems. 
  In the design phase it was recognized that the problem of thin markets could 
be exacerbated by the impact of random variation in weather conditions on the 
success of actions to reduce recharge. For example, many years of drought, would 
tend to lead to higher rates of establishment failure. Given that effects of weather on 
credit surpluses or deficits would tend to be correlated across years for participants 
within the geographically small trial area, potential for excess credit supply or 
demand within seasons was seen as a factor that could lead to people deciding not 
to participate in future market schemes. To overcome this impediment, banking and 
borrowing of credits is allowed. Goodstein (2002) found that in the U.S. unleaded 
gasoline refinement quota cap and trade system, temporal flexibility implemented 
through credit banking was a key reason for the program’s cost effectiveness. Thus 
in the Bet Bet trial, a participant who has credits in excess of obligations after annual 
performance monitoring and salinity account reconciliation, can bank or set aside 
credits to offset debits in future years. Any participant with credits banked in previous 
years can use them against debits to balance a current salinity account. 
POTENTIAL PROBLEMS 
In ideal markets where there are no transactions costs, trade takes place whenever 
there is potential for marginal gains and profit. Real markets for tradeable emissions 
credits, including recharge, require substantial investment of time by participants to 
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understand potential gains, seek out trading partners, and negotiate trades (Randall, 
2003). A potential impediment to credit trade results if potential gains from trade are 
low compared to transaction costs. Newell and Stavins (2003) and Sterner (2003) 
have identified small potential gains from trade arising from relatively small 
differences in marginal abatement costs across sources as an impediment to credit 
trade policy in point source contexts. Vanclay (2004) and Barr (1999) argue that 
financial returns are only one factor in the utility function determining farm 
management choices. When there is relatively little difference in payoffs across 
management practice, non-financial considerations such as family lifestyle are often 
key determinants of management practice choice. 
  The potential gains from trade in the salinity credit trade trial and returns 
arising from recharge reduction options across land management practices and 
landscapes within the Bet Bet were modeled. Results indicated that whilst there is 
sufficient differentiation in marginal abatement costs across practices and location, 
potential gains from trade are less than 10% of total revenues (Connor et al., 2004). 
Field interviews (ibid) suggest that some practices which farm economics modeling 
indicate can reduce recharge and improve returns, may be less attractive than purely 
economic considerations would indicate. More careful rotational grazing and other 
perennial pasture management in particular are effective at reducing recharge and 
have potential for slightly greater per hectare returns, but require much more 
management effort. 
Ultimately, potential for gains to credit trade are limited by differences in 
physical productivity and opportunity costs among potential trade participants. The 
amount that is actually realized can be influenced by policy design. Ensuring that 
participants realize potential gains from trade involves designing an administratively 
18 W. Proctor, J.D. Connor, J. Ward and D. Hatton MacDonald 
efficient method of monitoring and recharge accounting. Policy initiatives to ensure 
the introduction of cost effective monitoring and accounting schemes that are 
transparent, consistent and credible to all participants predicate successful cap and 
trade schemes. Accounting conventions establish a clear link between land 
management actions at appropriate scales and the consequent environmental 
outcome. As the functional relationship between river salinity, groundwater recharge 
and land actions are not readily visible, a proxy indicator inclusive of revegetation 
type, success of establishment and maintenance was imputed in this case study. 
  When the differential in marginal abatement costs is small, expressed as a flat 
payoff function, Pannel (2004) proposes that the manner of presentation and 
treatment of information to potential adopters can be a key determinant of the level 
of practice adoption. Strong social networks generally and membership in catchment 
groups (Cary et al. 2002), as well as extension and promotion programs (Marsh et al. 
2000) have been shown to be important determinants of conservation practice 
uptake in flat payoff function settings. This suggests that in trial implementation 
information and credit trade policies are likely to be complementary. A design 
solution to the impediment of a flat payoff function with little information is information 
provision. 
In all such schemes, there are also issues related to concerns of equity and 
fairness for all members of the catchment community being targeted. For example, 
there can be considerable equity concerns related to the method of entitlement 
distribution in cap and trade schemes. Perman et al. (1999, pp. 316-317) note that 
the initial distribution of property rights determines the division of the net gains which 
accrue to the negotiating parties. Thus, a major challenge in designing a credit trade 
system is the mechanism used to allocate the initial permits to individuals (Baumol 
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and Oates, 1988). Auctions and free distribution (grandfathering) are the two main 
procedures employed by governing agencies in the allocation of transferable 
resource permits. Revenues from auctioning of permits go to the state, whereas the 
benefits gained from the grandfathering accrue to those granted the entitlement 
(Tietenberg, 1999). 
  The status quo ante in the catchment is an upfront payment for 
implementation of a practice (e.g. a payment per hectare of trees planted). A primary 
focus of the trial is to test a performance based system with payments based on the 
outcomes of practices (e.g. payment on success rate of establishment of tree 
planting). The shift from the status quo ante to the trial approach will change 
expected costs, income and income variability. With the status quo ante, the risk of 
less than intended recharge reduction (e.g. through planting establishment failure) is 
assigned to the Government. Changing to a performance based system shifts that 
risk to farmers. There are two risks relating to returns that participants could face in a 
performance based system: a) risk associated with random, exogenous events such 
as rainfall variability, and b) the risk of management related failures of options in 
achieving recharge reduction. 
Given that the trial involves voluntary participation and that the status quo 
ante program continues to run simultaneously, there is potential for low enrollment 
rates to impede functioning if the trial involves greater risks to participants than the 
status quo ante without commensurate improvements in potential returns. 
If a fundamental change in property rights that created limits on dryland farm 
recharge could be implemented, distribution of recharge rights by auction would be 
possible. As mentioned above this is the mechanism that economic theory suggests 
is most economically efficient. Within the current property rights framework without 
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any explicit limits on recharge, the only possibility is to begin by grandfathering the 
right to the current level of recharge and offering payment for improved practice or 
performance. A tension arises because the approach that would create the superior 
performance incentive, payment on outcome, involves significant risk in comparison 
to the status quo ante incentive, payment on implementation of practice. Low 
participation rates are a likely outcome. The compromise solution implemented in the 
trial, involved a partial payment on establishment and a partial payment based on 
audited performance outcome. 
CONCLUSIONS AND NEXT STEPS 
Rigorous comparison of trial results with the status quo ante scenario to ascertain if 
significant salinity reduction has occurred is still too early to be carried out. The trial 
commenced in the first quarter of 2005 and the first performance appraisals of farms 
occurred around December with audits being completed around the first quarter of 
2006 (one year after the first contracts were signed). 
Upon completion of the trial in mid-2006, the success of this scheme relative 
to previous instruments and recharge management policies will be modeled and 
compared. Additionally, the beneficial effects of tree planting may not start to be 
realized until several years after the start of the trial. Although it is still too early to 
gauge the success or otherwise of the current trial, some policy related issues can 
be highlighted as a result of the review of the scheme provided in this paper, guiding 
and informing future decisions. 
One problem is the geographically constrained trial area which can potentially 
lead to the adverse effects of thin markets. Conceptually, the most obvious approach 
to overcoming thin market problems would be expansion of the scale of the trial to 
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include more participants. If this involved an expanded geographic area, it is also 
possible that potential for weather related excess credit supply or demand leading to 
thin markets would be reduced. Credit banking and borrowing across years as exists 
in the current trial is one approach to reducing thin market problems arising from 
weather related excess credit supply or demand. As the trial is only over two years it 
will be difficult to assess the effectiveness of credit banking but this ability should be 
subject to greater scrutiny if the trial is allowed to continue longer. 
  Theoretically, tradable recharge entitlements can be assigned to either one of 
the negotiating parties: farmers (as the source of recharge) or the downstream 
beneficiaries of recharge reduction. At present, the trial only involves participants 
from the Bet Bet Catchment – the initiators of the salinity problems. The current 
property rights framework allows farmers to manage recharge without regard to 
external effects. Participants are induced to cap recharge through an incentive 
payment. This is in contrast to the more common cap and trade approach, reliant on 
statutory obligations. A future option may seek to develop specified property rights 
for clean water for those harmed by salinity or recharge management obligations for 
those who create salinity. This would involve establishing legally defined and 
enforced limits on recharge rights or some proxy for recharge such as inputs, 
outputs, or practices correlated with groundwater emissions as a property rights 
basis for the tradable recharge policy trial. 
  As mentioned previously, some of the benefits and costs of the land-use 
change induced here may be impacting outside of the trial area and so some of the 
more important participants who should take part in the scheme are actually 
excluded. Redefining property rights could overcome the impediments of thin 
markets by engendering wider participation from agents characterized by a greater 
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differential in costs of salinity abatement. Finally, a thorough comparison of this 
scheme with the previous incentive scheme, where farmers were rewarded with cash 
payments for beneficial land-use change, is required. Careful measurement of the 
biophysical benefits, revenue implications for farmers and the cost effectiveness 
from the perspective of the implementing agency is required, including evaluation of 
the transaction, administration (including brokerage) and monitoring costs. 
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Figure 1.  Map of Bet Bet Catchment 
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Figure 2.   The Salinity Problem - schematic of the hydro-geology of irrigation water 
quality affected by variable upper catchment salt loads 
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Table 1.    Recharge Credits According to Audited Ground Cover Landscape Position 
and Annual Rainfall 
Practice (audited performance /ha)  Zone 1 
(700mm+)
a




Low density Farm Forestry (200 stems)  6.1 4.9  3.7
High density Farm Forestry (600 stems)  9.6 7.6  5.7
Low density Farm Forestry (180 stems)  5.4 4.3  3.2
High density Farm Forestry (540 stems)  8.4 6.8  5
Low density Farm Forestry (160 stems)  4.5 3.5  2.6
High density Farm Forestry (480 stems)  7 5.5  4.1
Low density Farm Forestry (140 stems)  3.5 2.7  2
High density Farm Forestry (420 stems)  5.5 4.3  3.2
Native Tree Establishment (600 stems)  21 16.9  12.7
Native Tree Establishment (540 stems)  19 15.1  11.3
Native Tree Establishment (480 stems)  15 12.1  9.1
Native Tree Establishment (420 stems)  12 9.4  7.1
Phalaris Pasture (100% cover)  2.4 2.4  2.4
Lucerne Pasture (100% cover)  4.4 4.2  3.5
Phalaris Pasture (90% cover)  2 2  2
Lucerne Pasture (90% cover) 3.5 3.5  3.5
Phalaris Pasture (80% cover)  1.6 1.6  1.6
Lucerne Pasture (80% cover)  3 3  3
Phalaris Pasture (70% cover)  1.2 1.2  1.2
Lucerne Pasture (70% cover) 2.5 2.5  2.5
a  Annual Rainfall (from Clifton 2004) 
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Table 2.  Schematic Representation of Salinity Recharge Credit Trial Functioning 
for an Illustrative Example 























Baseline recharge under current 
landuse, Qi
b = 
120 ML  200 ML  150 ML  300 ML 
Expected recharge for 
successfully established farm 
forestry = 
15 ML  70 ML  10 ML  100 ML 
Obligation under contract, Qi
0 =  105 ML  130 ML  140 ML  200 ML 
contract 
negotiation 
Start-up incentive = $50/ML * 
Qi
0 =  $5,250 $6,500  $7,000  $10,000 
Year of implementation: the season turns out to be low rainfall 
Landholder 1’s audit = 75% of 





    
Landholder 2’s audit = 80% of 







Landholder 3’s audit = 60% of 







Landholder 4’s audit = 65% of 
cover required to fulfil 
obligation 




All obligation seasonally 
adjusted by weighted avg 
performance of 69% of 
obligation 




debit/credit = audited 
seasonally adjusted recharge - 
obligation 
+6 ML  +14ML  -12ML  -8ML 
Landholder 1 sells 6 credits to 
Landholder 4 




- 2 ML balance 
Landholder 2 sells 12 credits to 
Landholder 3 
0 ML balance  + 2 ML 
balance 
0 ML balance  - 2 ML balance 
Landholder 2 sells 2 credits to 
Landholder 4 
0 ML balance  0 ML balance  0 ML balance  0 ML balance  Trading 
Bonus paid equal to 20% of 
start-up in proportion to 
contribution to total recharge  
$1,140 $1,510  $1,220 $1,885 
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